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METRO AND ITS JUDICIAL HISTORY
I. INTRODUCTION
At least twenty-two states have amended their constitutions to provide
for municipal home-rle in some degree.' The objective of home-rule
amendments is to free municipalities from state legislative control in the
realm of local affairs. A matter is deemed "local" only when it is held to
have no effect on citizens of the particular state living outside the
municipality involved.
2
In the State of Florida, since World War II, various attempts have
been made to consolidate governmental functions within Dade County.3
In 1945, 1947, and 1953, consolidation proposals were advanced in an
attempt to merge city and county governments. The 1953 proposal failed
by a mere 980 votes. 4 These proposals, although failing, did alert public
officials to the fact that there was a metropolitan problem.5
Subsequently, the City of Miami created the Metropolitan Miami
Municipal Board to study and evaluate metropolitan government.6 The
Board was succeeded by two Charter Boards and led to the granting of a
commission by the State Legislature to draft a constitutional amendment
and charter designed to institute "home rule" in Dade County.7  On
November 6, 1956, the state electorate adopted the constitutional amend-
ment, Article VIII, Section 11. The Home Rule Charter subsequently was
approved by the Dade County citizenry on May 21, 1957, in a special
referendum.
Article VIII, Section 11, of the Florida Constitution, as amended in
1956, was to the effect that
[T]he electors of Dade County, Florida, are granted power to
adopt, revise, and amend from time to time a home rule charter of
government for Dade County, Florida, under. which the Board of
County Commissioners of Dade County shall be the governing
body.8
1. Among the states so numbered are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin. See Note, 72 HARV. L. REV. 738 (1959). For an excellent
treatment of the Metropolitan special district cast in a constitutional light with the
overall legal aspects, see generally, Tobin, Metropolitan Special District: Intercounty
Metropolitan Government of Tomorrow, 14 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333 (1960).
. 2. See Dasch v. Jackson, 170 Md. 251 183 Atl. 534 (1936); Note, 72 HARv.
L. REV. 741 (1959).
3. Note, 73 HARV. L. REV. 526_ (1960.)..
4. Public Administration Service, Government of Metropolitan Miami (1954).
5. See note 3 supra at 530. Id. at Preface.
6. See note 3 supra at 530-31.
7. Ibid.
8. FLORIDA CONST. art. VIII, § 1101).
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The ensuing Home Rule Charter 9 containod numerous provisions
designed to permit the exercise of a wide range of powers by the County
Commissioners acting as the legislative body of the new county-wide
government.
Thus, as a result of these powers, the Commissioners have effected a
complete administrative reorganization of the Dade County government in
addition to taking the following steps' 0 leading toward a metropolitan form
of government:
1) Creation of a Metropolitan court system which tries all traffic
cases originating in Dade County plus all cases arising under
the Home Rule Charter.
2) Adoption of a uniform traffic code which is enforced throughout
the county by municipal and county officers.
3) Initiation of a county-wide traffic engineering department.
4) Establishment of a county tax reassessment program which
will lead to uniform assessment and collection of taxes.
5) Initiation of the Metropolitan Dade County Planning
Department designed to aid in future development plans.
6) Planning of a county-wide water and sewer service.
7) Appointment of the Metropolitan County Transit Authority.
8) Adoption of a uniform building code.
9) Establishment of uniform standards for motor vehicle inspec-
tions.
10) Passage of regulations covering all county activities in gun sales,
animal licensing, dynamiting, and the sale of used-car parts.
11) Creation of a central police radio communications system.
12) Completion of a central accident records bureau.
The Charter and the legislative activities of the County Commissioners
have resulted in provoking considerable litigation. This in turn had led to
some confusion and conflict as to the present legal status of metropolitan
government (hereinafter Metro) in Dade County. It is hoped that a brief
survey treatment of the important judicial decisions in this area will serve
to clarify Metro's position as viewed by the courts.
The reader will note that the cases are discussed in chronological order.
II. SURVEY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS
In Gray v. Golden," the Florida Supreme Court upheld the proposed
constitutional amendment providing for home rule in Dade County. The
court, in a lengthy opinion, stated that the proposed amendment to
Article VIII, Section 11, of the Florida Constitution did not violate the
9. Code of Metropolitan Dade County, Florida. The Charter is recorded in
Official Records Book 182, p. 667, Public Records of Dade County, Florida.
10. The Miami Herald, Oct. 19, 1960, p. 7-A, col. 5.
11. 89 So.2d 785 (Fla. 1956).
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constitutional requirement that any revision or amendment of the constitu-
tion may relate to one subject or any number of subjects, but that no
amendment shall consist of more than one revised article of the constitution.
The lower court had construed the "revised article" requirement to mean
that no amendment of a single article of the Constitution can limit, restrict
or modify the provisions of any other constitutional article. It was the view
of the lower court that the proposed amendment would permit such broad
powers to be exercised by the new Metropolitan Government that the
lawmaking powers of the state legislature - would be impaired, that the
state's judicial department would be affected, and that the power and
jurisdiction of state agencies would be usurped.
In reversing the lower court's decree, the court stated that the express
terms of the proposed amendment prohibited such future happenings. The
opinion relied heavily on the case of City of Coral Gables v. Gray,'2 wherein
the Florida Supreme Court had ruled that in order to constitute more than
one amendment, the proposition submitted must not only relate to more
than one subject but, in addition, must have at least-two separate and
distinct purposes not dependent upon or connected with each other..
The court stated:
[I]f several propositions that are unrelated are submitted as one
and cannot be reconciled as such on any reasonable thesis, then
they meet the condemnation of the constitutional mandate. We
have no such situation here, local self-government is the only
concern of the proposed amendment.
In Dade County v. Kelly13 the Sheriff of Dade County challenged an
ordinance of the County Commission and the controlling provisions of
the Home Rule Charter, insofar as they applied in the matter of trans-
ferring the.duties of the County Police and County Fire Departments, in
addition'to. the non-civil process services of the County Sheriff, to the
Public Safety Department.
The Circuit Court of Dade County entered d temporary injunction
and an appeal was taken by the County. In affirming the order appealed
'from, the Supreme Court held that under the Dade County Home Rule
Amendment, total abolition of a county office is a condition precedent
to a transfer of' its functions. Thus, charter provisions purporting to grant
to the County Commissioners authority to transfer any of the functions
of county officers, :aind to make piecemeal transfers while the' office of
County Sheriff was still in existence, transcended the amendment and was
void .1
4
12. 154 Fla. 881, 19 So.2d 318 (1944).
13. 99 So.2d 856 (Fla. 1957); Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 14 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 501, 517-18 (1960).
14. It is interesting to note that upon expiration of. Sheriff Kelly's elective term
in January of 1961, he was appointed by the County Manager as County Sheriff for
an unspecified term.
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Justice Thornal, concurring in part and dissenting in part, expressed
the view that the amendment in question should have been construed to
allow Dade County more flexibility and a broader opportunity for experi-
mentation within the outer limits of the organic law. The Justice, joined
by Chief Justice Terrell, believed this view to be more nearly consonant
with the express directive of the Home Rule Amendment that it be
liberally construed.
In Chase v. Cowart,"' Florida's highest court affirmed a lower decree
which determined that the Dade County Budget Commission had been
abolished by adoption of the Home Rule Charter on May 21, 1957. In
addition, the Supreme Court decided that a general act of the State
Legislature was ineffective insofar as it attempted to ratify, affirm, and
validate the Charter. The Charter, as approied, contained the specific
proviso that "The Budget Commission created by Chapter 21874, Laws
of Fla., 1943, is hereby abolished and Chapter 21874 shall no longer be
of any effect."
The court opined:
We consider the basic question in this cause to be whether or not
the electors of Dade County had given to them in Section 11 [of
the Florida Constitution] the authority and power to abolish
the Dade County Budget Commission. We are of the opinion
that they had the authority to do so under the provisions of
subsection (1) (c), Section 11, and that by adoption of the home
rule charter they have done so.
In State v. City of Miami,16 Justice Drew, speaking for the Supreme
Court, held that the Dade County Home Rule Charter, applicable to
the waterworks system in the City of Miami, did not impair the power
of the city to issue water revenue bonds. The State, as defendant in this
proceeding by the City of Miami to validate a waterworks bond issue,
contended that the Charter deprived the City of the exclusive right to
operate a waterworks system in the City.
However, the court was of the view that while the County Com-
missioners acting under the Charter could exercise certain powers over
municipalities of Dade County and any water supply system operated by
any municipality therein, such powers had no effect until affirmatively
exercised in accordance with the Charter. Thus, since the County (Metro)
had not acted, the City could not be prevented from acting to improve
its own water service facilities.
Dade County v. Dade County League of Municipalities'7 presented
a case wherein the constitutionality of a proposed "municipal autonomy
15. 102 So.2d 147, 150 (Fla. 1958); Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 14 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 501, 518 (1960).
16. 103 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1958).
17. 104 So.2d 512, 518 (Fla. 1958); Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 14 U.
MIAMi L. REV. 501, 518 (1960).
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amendment" to the previously approved Home Rule Charter was consid-
ered. Plaintiff sought a declaratory decree regarding the proposal's con-
stitutionality, and requested an injunction against the holding of a special
election to dispose of the autonomy amendment. It was conceded that
the holding of the election would involve an expenditure of approximately
$85,000, and it would be to the interest of the taxpayers of the county
to have a determination of the proposed amendment prior to the expenditure
of public funds. Appellants contended that the amendment contravened
various parts of Article VIII, Section 11, of the Florida Constitution, and
that if adopted, it would for all practical purposes destroy the concept of
Dade County metropolitan government inherent in the Charter.
The Court determined that if the electorate of Dade County wished
to limit the Home Rule Charter in any manner, that such was its pre-
rogative. Its view was that:
[T]he invalidity of the entire amendment not having been shown
the submission of the amendment to the electorate for approval
or disapproval is proper.
The proposed amendment was subsequently defeated.
In Dade County v. Young Democratic Club of Dade County,18 the
question in issue went to the constitutionality of sections 2.03 and 2.04
of the Charter, which provided for the non-partisan election of county
commissioners in Dade County. Considering the matter as one calling
for a close scrutiny of the language of the Home Rule Amendment, the
opinion said:
[W]hen the electors of the state approved the Home Rule Amend-
ment for Dade County, the electors of the county were expressly
authorized to determine the 'method of election' of county com-
missioners. Pursuant to such authorization, they adopted the non-
partisan plan and we think they had ample power to do so.
The court added that nothing in the Florida Constitution prohibits candi-
dates from qualifying for office in Dade County under a different rule from
that under which they qualify in other counties.
The significant decision in Miami Shores v. Cowart 9 upheld the
Metropolitan Traffic Code which expressly nullified and superseded the
traffic ordinances of all the municipalities in Dade County, and provided
that violations of the Code should be tried exclusively in the Metropolitan
Court of Dade County.
The court, in its opinion, considered itself compelled to quote
extensively from the Chancellor's decree which had ruled in favor of the
area-wide Code. Typical was the phrasing to the effect that:
18. 104 So.2d 636, 639 (Fla. 1958); Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 14 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 501, 518 (1960).
19. 108 So.2d 468, 470 (Fla. 1958); Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 14 U.
MIAMI I,. REV. 501, 518 (1960).
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[T]he type of metropolitan government adopted for Dade County
allocated to the municipalities specific rights of self determination
• . . in municipal affairs, and reserved to the county . . . power
to pass ordinances . . . relating to the affairs, property and
government throughout the county. . . . It recognizes the most
vital single problem facing Dade County; that is, the urgent need
for the establishment of an area-wide framework for effective local
government.
Thus, the County Traffic Code was validated since it fell within the
constitutional mandate given to the County Commissioners to provide
regulation and control on a county-wide basis of those municipal functions
and services which are susceptible to, and could be carried on most effectively
under a uniform plan of regulation applicable to Dade County as a whole.
This case would seem to settle the jurisdictional question as to the Metro
Traffic Code. Therefore, it would appear that the City of Miami Beach is
currently acting without jurisdiction in attempting to enforce the City's
superseded traffic laws by trying violators in the municipality's traffic court.
Involved in City of Miami v. Kenton2 0 was a class suit which sought
to recover fines paid to the City for violations of city traffic ordinances after
March 1, 1958. The date noted was the effective date of a Metro ordinance,
57-12, which regulated traffic matters throughout the county, and expressly
nullified all municipal traffic ordinances. It appears that the city had
continuously tried violations of city traffic ordinances in the city court before
and after March 1, 1958. It was alleged that there were approximately
190,000 persons per annum who had paid fixed fines to the city as a result
of summons without the necessity of going to court. In addition, it was
alleged that over 50,000 persons yearly were tried, convicted and paid fines
to the City of Miami.
In denying entitlement of the plaintiffs to recover the fines paid to
the city after enactment of the county ordinance, the Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Terrell, relied on the rule that where one makes
a payment of any sum under a claim of right with knowledge of the facts,
such a payment is voluntary and cannot be recovered. The court stated
there was no showing either that any of the payments were made under
protest, or that the offenses provoking the fines were not committed. In
employing the above described device, the court permitted the city to
escape from 'what might well have-been a devastating financial blow. In
addition, the Metro Traffic Code was upheld.
In the twin cases of City of Miami v. Benitez,21 and City of Miami v.
Baldwin,22 the city-plaintiff advanced the argument that Miami had
adopted the Metro traffic ordinances and, therefore, had concurrent juris-
diction with the Metro Court to try offenders of county traffic ordinances.
20. 115 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1959).
21. 116 So.2d 463 (Fla. App. 1959).
22. 116 So.2d 464 (Fla. App. 1959).
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The traffic offenses had occurred on the streets of the city of Miami. There-
after, the offenders were convicted in the Municipal Court of the City.
The Circuit Court had reversed the judgment of conviction. In affirming
the reversal, the District Court of Appeal relied on the prior Florida
Supreme Court decisions in City of Miami v. Keton2 3 and City of Miami
Beach v. Cowart.2 4 The effect of the Court of Appeal cases was to hold
that under the Dade County traffic ordinance and the Metropolitan Court
ordinance, the Municipal Court of the City of Miami had no jurisdiction
to hear and determine charges of violations of the Dade County traffic
ordinance.
A novel contention of the City of Miami Beach was condemned by the
Florida Supreme Court in City of Miami v. Cowart.25  Here, the City
espoused the argument that the Home Rule Amendment authorized the
metropolitan government of Dade County to function only in the unin-
corporated areas of Dade County.
The court said, laconically, that the contention was "untenable for
reasons so obvious as to make discussion thereof unnecessary." The opinion
referred to the Miami Shores decision2 6 as controlling in this case.
Just what particular Metro ordinances were under attack in the instant
case were not specified. However, the tersely worded opinion by Justice
Roberts expressed the view that the ordinances dealt with municipal services
which were "susceptible to, and could be most effectively carried on under,
a uniform plan of regulation, applicable to the county as a whole." Since
the ordinances complied with the Miami Shores case "standard," 27 they
were upheld without question.
The case of State ex rel. Greenberg v. Dade County28 involved the
construction of a Metro licensing ordinance which provided for issuing of
certificates of competency for county-wide use by certain trades including
the electrical trade. The ordinance contained a "grandfather clause" which
purported to permit a tradesman who met certain requirements to receive
a license without examination. Thus, a person who, within a stated period,
had received a trade :license from one of a number of cities within the
county, or who submitted proof of more than five years licensed practice of
his trade in the unincorporated county area was entitled, by the terms of
the Metro ordinance, to receive a license permitting practice anywhere
within Dade County, unless an examining board, in its discretion, deemed
otherwise.
23. See note 20 supra.
24. See note 19 supra.
25. 116 So.2d 432 (Fla. 1960).
26. See note 19 supra.
27. Ibid.
28. 120 So.2d 625, 627 (Fla. App. 1960).
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Appellant submitted proof of a ten-year licensed participatioi in his
trade within the unincorporated county area. The county had originally
issued the trade license. The trial court construed the ordinance, 57-25, to be
discretionary in the above respect, and mandamus to compel the issuance
of the certificate was denied.
In reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeal held the proper
construction of the ordinance to be that upon a showing of the licensed
exercise of his trade in the unincorporated area for the time specified, the
appellant had submitted proof on which it thereafter became the duty of
the Board to extend the former's certificate so as to include the total area
of the county. The opinion dogmatically stated:
It is clear that a licensing ordinance which allows a board to issue
or withhold a certificate of competency, at its whim and not
according to any fixed or ascertainable standards, requirements or
qualifications of the applicant, would not be valid.
Thus, the court effectively eliminated the discretionary element con-
tained within the licensing provision.
29
A series of interesting problems presented themselves in Boyd v. County
of Dade,30 wherein two parties were convicted in the Metro Court of
drunken driving in violation of a Metro ordinance. At the trial the
defendants made a motion for trial by jury contending they were entitled to
a jury trial under the state constitution; the trial judge denied the motion.
Thereafter, defendants appealed directly to the Florida Supreme Court as
permitted under the constitutional provision allowing appeals to be taken
from "trial courts" 3' directly to the Supreme Court in cases construing
controlling provisions of the Constitution. In rejecting the defendants'
claim of entitlement to a jury trial for the offenses charged, the court
relied on the landmark cases of Hunt v. City of Jacksonville32 and State ex
rel. Sellers v. Parker,33 wherein it was held by the Florida Supreme Court
that violations of municipal ordinances were infractions, the trial of which
could be conducted without a jury. The court was astute in noting that
trials in municipal courts were conducted generally without juries long prior
to the adoption of the constitution and thus, did not fall within the
constitutional guarantee regarding jury trials. The court had no difficulty
in construing a metropolitan county court to be in close proximity with a
municipal court.
29. Metro's subsequent appeal against the appellate court ruling was rejected by
the Florida Supreme Court in January, 1961. The practical effect of the Greenberg
case will be to force Metro to grant some 350 unrestricted licenses to tradesmen
heretofore barred from working in certain Dade County municipalities, notably, Miami,
Miami Beach, and Coral Gables. See The Miami Herald, Jan. 20, 1961, p. 17-A, col. 2.
30. 123 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1960).
31. See State v. Furen, 118 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1960).
32. 34 Fla. 504, 16 So. 398 (1894).
33. 87 Fla. 181, 100 So. 260 (1924).
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The special financial interest of one of the County Commissioners
in real estate located on Elliott Key, an island to the southeast of Miami
proper, was pertinent in the recent case of Fossey v. Dade County.34 The
Home Rule Charter contained a provision that:
Any county official or employee of the county who has a special
financial interest, direct or indirect, in any action by the Board
shall make known that interest and shall refrain from voting upon
or otherwise participating in such transaction.
35
Commissioner Ralph A. Fossey was the owner of a one-half interest
in approximately 64 acres of land on Elliott Key, one of several keys to
be connected with the mainland by a proposed system of causeways. In
view of the Charter provision, a question arose as to whether the Com-
missioner was disqualified to vote on a Board resolution for the issuance
of bonds to construct the causeway system. The circuit court, in declaratory
judgment action, decreed the plaintiff-Commissioner to be barred from
participating or voting regarding the causeway resolution. The appellate
court, in affirming the circuit court's decree, stated that Commissioner
Fossey's financial interest would be affected in a very real and substantial
manner depending on the outcome of the vote of the Board of which he
was a member. Thus, the Charter provision was applicable to preclude the
commissioner's vote under the factual circumstances.
III. CONCLUSION
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the emergence of the
sprawling center of urban life that is Dade County, Florida, has created
myriad governmental and economic problems which require an advanced
political structure for their solution.36 A three and one-half year period
is too short a time to determine whether the Metro Charter has provided
Dade County with the ultra-modern political mechanism which so many
civic-minded individuals have envisioned. However, an analysis of the
significant judicial determinations construing the Charter power-wise, permits
discernment of momentous advancements by Metro toward the objective
for which it was designed, namely, "effective home rule government in
this county .... ,,37 Consequently, in view of Metro's brief, but successful
history, one can only look to its future with optimism.
38
34. 123 So.2d 755 (Fla. App. 1960).
35. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE, CHARTER § 4.03(e).
36. See Note, 73 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1960). See generally WOLFF, MIAMI
METRO (1960), for a well-written treatise depicting the economic and ecological phases
of the new governmental structure in Dade County.
37. METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE, CHARTER § 8.06(a).
38. Interview with Professor Edward Sofen, Dept. of Government, Univ. of Miami,
in Coral Gables, Fla., Dec. 20, 1960. Professor Sofen is of the opinion that various
economic, factors will contribute- to Metro's development. He believes that Metro's
ability to take over certain county-wide functions and relieve the municipalities of the
attendant financial burdens will do much to lessen organized resistance to Metro.
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By and large, the judiciary have given a faithful allegiance to the man-
date of the Home Rule enabling amendment"9 which proclaims:
It is declared to be the intent of the Legislature and of the electors
of the State of Florida to provide by this section home rule for the
people of Dade County in local affairs and this section shall be
liberally construed to carry out such purpose. . . . (Emphasis
added.)
With the continued support of the judiciary, Metro appears destined for
a bright future in Dade County's government. A contrary prognostication
would ignore Metro's past advances and future potentialities.
JOSEPH P. METZGER
39. FLORIDA CONST. art. VIII, § 11(9).
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